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“Es ist unmoralisch, ein menschliches Wesen zur Wirkung einer Ursache zu 
machen, es als Bedingtes hervorzubringen, wie das mit der Elternschaft 
gegeben ist; und der Mensch ist im tiefsten Grunde nur deshalb unfrei 
determiniert neben seiner Freiheit… weil her auf diese unsittliche Wiese 
entstanden ist. Daß die Menschheit ewig bestehe, das ist gar kein Interesse 
der Vernunft; wer die Menschheit verewigen will, der will ein Problem und 
eine Schuld verewigen, das einzige Problem, die einzige Schuld, die es gibt. 
Das Ziel ist ja gerade die Gottheit, und Aufhören der Menschheit in der 
Gottheit; das Ziel ist die reine Scheidung zwischen Gut und Böse, zwischen 
Etwas und nichts.”2 
Otto Weininger, Geschlecht und Charakter, 458 
 
Preface: Philosophical Presuppositions 
 
This essay returns to Adi Ophir’s intuition that nihilism is fundamentally related 
to the possibility of generating values or undermining them.3 Understood in that way, 
nihilism’s privileged role would be best seen as (surreptitiously) providing justifications 
for action. For this ethico-pragmatic reading of nihilism, Ophir is indebted to Walter 
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Benjamin and to Nietzsche, insofar as nihilism, as ingredient in values, need be neither 
conscious nor spelled out in a program of political or cultural engagements.  
 This essay proceeds on the distinction between epistemological and 
methodological nihilism. The distinction is somewhat artificial in that epistemological 
nihilism may require methodological nihilism, or indeed ground and justify the outcome 
of a nihilistic method. Nevertheless, the distinction is important for understanding a work 
that has been called the foremost manifesto of Viennese expressionism, Otto Weininger’s 
Geschlecht und Charakter: Eine prinzipielle Untersuchung (1903).  
Simply put, epistemological nihilism states that there is no fundamental meaning 
to existence, whether human or cosmic. We find expressions of this in Gorgias’ 
arguments surviving from the lost treatise On Nature.4 It occurs surreptitiously in 
philosophies of history whose coherence is assured by an entelechy, whether secular or 
spiritual. It may be found in thoughts where the human task or destiny is one of becoming 
an end or attaining a perfection so enigmatic or solipsistic that one can but rely on 
intuition (and quite possibly fantasy) to reach that promise. This is not to say that 
epistemological nihilism is wrongheaded, much less wholly avoidable. What I am 
highlighting is Nietzsche’s criticism of those systems moved by entelechies for which we 
invest or sacrifice our lives. Of course, part of the difficulty in determining what is an 
epistemological nihilism is that many such are philosophies of history and secularizations 
of messianism; this includes Hegel and Schelling, notably, but many romantic visions as 
well, and I add Schopenhauer to that list. Nietzsche, on the other hand, is explicit about 




Methodological nihilism takes at least two forms: the one, as a moving adjuvant to 
epistemological nihilism; the other, as critique moved by the consciousness of our 
finitude or fundamental limitation. The first form stands in service to certain 
epistemological nihilisms, denoting the motor through which historical or spiritual 
entelechies are gradually reached, provided one grasps the architectonic of the logic; for 
example, the “work of the negative” in Hegelian and neo-Hegelian philosophies. The 
second form is Benjamin’s brilliant rethinking of the aforementioned methodological 
nihilism, which consists in appropriating and subverting its infinitist trend, which has 
consequences for epistemological nihilism. Again, what Benjamin works with is a 
restricted nihilism consisting of the ongoing (ethical) critique of institutions and 
practices, as if a sense could be discerned in history. 
Further, as Nitzan Lebovic points out in his analyses in this volume, 
epistemological nihilism may take an explicit or an implicit (unacknowledged) form. As 
explicit, such nihilism, in arguing for the absence of ultimate sense in human existence, 
whether social or individual, calls for responses that may be esthetic or esthetico-
existential, certainly of a solipsistic cast. What is intriguing about more implicit nihilisms 
lies in the construal of what moves a history or a society toward the culminating 
entelechy announced at the beginning or the end of the system. The attainment of a 
certain absoluteness of mind, nature, or society (or all three) proceeds here thanks to a 
method by which realities are transformed through negation or contrariety. This is not 
simply to equate negation or its “work” with nihilism eo ipso. The nihilism in question is 
largely invisible, like the shadow cast by the sun of the absolute. The conundrum is that 
methodologies of transformation and becoming, when operative within the philosophical 
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nihilism of entelechies, produce formal utopias of knowledge or existence, thereby 
hardening divisions between principle and enactment, theory and practice, even as they 
deny this hardening. Against such a sequestration of theory and practice, it bears 
repeating that the same “work of the negative” continues, undermining the gains or 
institutions whose unfolding it assured, motivating dreams of renewed beginnings—or, in 
the best of cases, rethinking the logic that underlay the initial conception of ascent 
involved.  
These dilemmas have been widely discussed, although the curious outcome is 
often the pitting of an existential nihilism against the methodological or epistemological 
nihilisms uncovered. It is not my concern to pursue these discussions here, but rather to 
revisit a moment of epistemological nihilism in a parodic vein. Thus I return to the 
aforementioned moment in the history of thought in which a moral vision of the “ends of 
man” was proposed as a response to advances in embryology, the nascent “woman 
question,” and the rise of race science. That was the hybrid work of young Otto 
Weininger entitled Sex and Character: An Investigation in Fundamental Principles.  
Before turning to this uncanny treatise, let me make one last remark about the 
circle of reason opened by nihilism when it inhabits epistemology. That is, when 
philosophies of history or of mind open to utopia, then utopia needfully figures in the 
legitimation of the philosophies in question. In cases of such circularity, we may suspect 
epistemological nihilism and demand that the implications of this either be made clear or 
that the separation between the ideal and the practical be explored. This is part of what 
Walter Benjamin intended, it seems to me, when he argued for (restricted) 
methodological nihilism, or the vigilant critique of utopian practices and institutions 
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coupled with the full awareness of mortality, ours and that of institutions. It is from 
Benjamin’s Theologisch-politisches Fragment, then, that the distinction between 
epistemological nihilism and methodological nihilism takes on its meaning. What 
Benjamin understood is that nihilism is not simply something we can overcome—notably 
through a “restoration of metaphysics” or through revolution—but rather something to be 
taken up as a practice (Benjamin, 2002, 306). It is only in practice that nihilism’s 
relationship to values can be concretely evinced and the two above-mentioned domains 
(epistemological nihilism and nihilism as critique) held in a tensed rapprochement.5  
  
Weininger’s Investigation of Fundamental Principles 
My argument here will be that Otto Weininger’s Sex and Character begins from a 
restricted methodological nihilism (“First Part: Sexual Diversity”) only to slide into a full 
blown epistemological nihilism (“Second or Main Part: The Sexual Types”).  
The work and life of Weininger, in all its pathos and perplexity, thus illustrates an 
argumentative drift, from practical nihilism as critique of the dominant values of the Belle 
Époque toward epistemological nihilism as the man’s overcoming of his bodily nature. 
Driven by a boundless intellectual curiosity, Weininger set out to explain the wealth and 
diversity of human “character” (in his day, “differential psychology”) while also 
uncovering the forces underlying sexuation, erotic attraction, and the ‘perceptual’ 
dimensions of anti-Semitism. From scholarship in the Classics, Weininger moved into 
biology at the University of Vienna, and ultimately into idealist philosophy and 
Nietzsche’s thought. His doctoral thesis, Eros und Psyche, was a study on the 
fundamental sexual hybridism of all living beings and the impact of this on human 
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characters. He submitted the thesis to an ambivalent jury. Once defended, he set to work 
on an expanded version consisting of two unequal parts: the scientific discussion of the 
chemical components of masculinity and femininity, characterology, and algorithms for 
sexual attraction. Part I closed with a discussion of the “woman question” and examined 
prospects for female emancipation. Elements from sexologist Magnus Hirschfeld’s 
research into sexual indeterminacy (sexuelle Zwischenstufen) and “Uranians,” or a “third 
sex”—not to mention physician, Wilhelm Fließ’s hypotheses about physiological 
periodicity—supported his principal argument that every de facto human being was 
physiologically a combination of maleness and femaleness. Part II exploded into a 
philosophical discussion of ideal types, “Die sexuellen Typen” he called “Mann” and 
“Weib” as opposed to de facto “Man” and “Frau.” This part proceeded on the formal 
definition of the two limit types; it opened onto masculine and feminine essences, 
consciousness, and finally talents and “Genialität.” It extended theoretical discussion of 
the types into ethics, social teleology or social entelechy, and the essence of the feminine 
and its meaning in the universe (Chapter XII, “Das Wesen des Weibes und sein Sinn im 
Universum”). Chapter XIII was devoted to “Das Judentum” (Jewry), and struggled 
against more metaphysical forms of anti-Semitism such as supercessionism. The ultimate 
chapter developed the equation “Problem des Juden = Problem des Weibes = Problem 
der Sklaverei.”  
At the core of this ‘dilemma’ was the ultimate status of femininity: how to 
comprehend it, how to determine it? If—within the logic of ideal types—activity, reality, 
substance, could be symbolized as 1 or unity, then passivity, unreality, and absence 
should be formalized as 0. Between 1 and 0 lay the spectrum of sexuation in living 
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beings. Yet the 0 that abbreviated the ideal type that was femininity also entailed an 
indeterminate activity that Weininger characterized as Kuppelei, coupling or bonding (the 
English translation renders the derogatory connotation with the term “matchmaking”). 
In order to understand the purpose of Woman we must start with a very old 
and well-known phenomenon, which has never been seriously considered, 
let alone properly recognized. It is none other than the phenomenon of 
matchmaking, which can lead us to the deepest, most important, insight 
into the nature of Woman. (Weininger, 2005, 231)6  
In short, the nothing was active; it nothinged. It was active essentially as 
correlational, thanks to the presence and influence on it of the all or masculine ideal type. 
Replaying a conundrum that a philosopher like Georges Canguilhem would observe 
about attempts to define “the pathological” against a single standard of normality, 
Weininger thereby found himself caught in the paradox of a feminine ideal type defined 
on the basis of the masculine—and yet somehow necessarily implicated in bringing 
human beings together erotically.7 The problem was significant because the feminine 
ideal type was present by degrees in all living things and went some way toward defining 
what Weininger understood as the difference between Aryan and Jewish men.  
First, however, I will explain exactly what I mean by Judaism. I do not 
mean either a race or a nation, and even less a legally recognized religious 
faith. Judaism must be regarded as a cast of mind, a psychic constitution, 
which is a possibility for all human beings and which has only found its 
most magnificent realization in historical Judaism. (Weininger, 2005, 274)8 
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Any group possessed of a high percentage of femininity qualified thus as lacking in 
spirit—“even the most masculine Jew has a Platonic methexis [participation] in Women” 
(Weininger, 2005, 276). It thus redounded to beings of high masculine ‘content’ to 
develop their potentiality for genius, above all in terms of moral self-awareness. The 
moral agent was able to bridge the distinction between nature and freedom by incarnating 
the moral law in himself. The clearest way, Weininger argued, to bring this about had to 
pass by a focus on the relationship which offered the greatest danger of 
instrumentalization of another human being. Not unpresciently, Weininger identified this 
relation as sexuality. In order that a human being realize its (masculine) potential—i.e. its 
creative ability to self-overcome—it should abide by the moral law within, avoiding, 
amongst other things, the instrumentalization of women as sexual beings. However, as it 
was the male gaze that constituted woman as a distinctly feminine entity (the feminine 
being in itself nothing, mere Kuppelei), avoiding sexual contact also implied the 
dissolution of the category of woman (Weib). Now, the disappearance of woman as ideal 
type (and implicitly as gender) promised their true emancipation as de facto women, 
hopefully allowing women to realize that percentage of their creative potential coming 
from the male principle in them. If the human species were thereby condemned to 
disappearing, perhaps the price was not as great as it seemed, as part of humanity would 
have realized Nietzschean self-overcoming via the enactment of the Kantian moral law 
extended to sexuality. Human kind would gradually merge into a Schellingian divinity, in 
which Schelling’s principle of inertia or Weininger’s nothing (das Weibliche) was 




As I pointed out, a nihilistic epistemology may not acknowledge its commitment to 
“nothing,” much less its inability to exit the circle of dismantling and rebuilding logical 
phantasms. I will attempt to show how Weininger moved from a positivistic vision of 
critical openness toward a stultifying cosmological ethic. Indeed, Sex and Character went 
initially unnoticed until his suicide in the same year (1903) aroused such a stir that the 
volume sold off the shelves, going through over twenty editions and influencing authors 
as far flung as Ludwig Wittgenstein and Karl Kraus, D. H. Lawrence and James Joyce—
to mention but a few. Weininger became a sort of ‘canary’ in the ‘coal mine’ that was an 
epoch of anxiety before emergent feminism, homosexual movements, socialism, and 
literary mysticism. The question is why he slid irresistibly from critique and science into 
epistemological nihilism. I hope to illustrate this in the narrative that follows. 
Weininger started from the hypothesis that all living beings were composed of 
elements of masculinity and those of femininity—at the cellular level (“arrhenoplasm” 
and “thelyplasm”). He hoped to explain human nature starting, this way, from 
embodiment. In so doing he believed he held a key to understanding eros itself, as 
attraction and the possibility of love. Influenced by the elaborate research and the 
emancipator’s zeal of sexologist Magnus Hirschfeld, Weininger turned to science to 
explain racial differences in light of his paradigm of dynamic intersexuation. His project 
could not have come at a better time. Sexology was a burgeoning field thanks to the 
works of Richard Krafft-Ebing, Georg Groddeck, Paul Julius Möbius, and indirectly Emil 
Kraepelin and Eugen Bleuler—not to mention Freud and Breuer. The binarism of 
masculine and feminine appeared to be opening to the possibility of a third sex, 
homosexual men, and the German-language movement for the “Schutz des Mutterrechts” 
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(protection of motherhood) inaugurated an early feminism (Rosa Mayreder). Explaining 
anti-Semitism in light of the “effeminacy” of Jewish men certainly displaced focus from 
the theological claim against Jews as the murderers of God toward a socio-biological 
misfortune devoid of any particular danger. Finally, proposing a synthesis of Nietzsche 
and Kant, such that self-overcoming passed through self-perfection and the free election 
never to treat women as sexual instruments, rejoined the ascetic creativity of (a notably 
Viennese) expressionism. These were the objectives of Weininger’s study.  
Weininger did not so much write a philosophy as a hybrid study that began by 
exploring the embryology and sexology of his day. The second part of the work brought 
philosophical reflection to bear on the meaning of the ideal types of masculinity, 
femininity, and the genius. One might qualify Sex and Character as a “middlebrow” 
essay, whose principal challenge was to develop categories able to bridge the ideal and 
the practical levels (unrestricted methodological nihilism), to give European humanity the 
conceptual wherewithal by which to live an ethical life as sexually intermediate beings.  
Prior to publishing his thesis, Weininger was very active in the intellectual life of 
Vienna. Like Freud and many Viennese intellectuals at the turn of the century, he 
attended the Philosophical Society of the University of Vienna, many of whose 
discussions concerned the initially disturbing movements around women’s emancipation, 
and “Uranians.” These questions must be considered in light of the larger context that 
combined German-language socialism, syndicalism, and the chilling mood promoted by 
the popular anti-Semitic mayor of Vienna, Karl Lueger (1844-1910; Mayor from 1897 to 
1910). It is difficult to calculate the symbolic impact, especially in the discussions of the 
Philosophical Society, of the rise of the Jewish population of Vienna between 1860 and 
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1910, where numbers went from 6000 to 175,000, a thirty-fold increase in two 
generations.9 It is not false, though it is easy to say that, at the turn of the century during 
the Belle Époque, philosophers found themselves singularly inept at dealing with the 
reverberations of what could only have been conceived as new vectors of conflict and 
change: females, polychromatic colonized peoples, Western and Eastern Jews—but also, 
embryology and genetics.10 That is, genetics, but without a genetic code. “Zuchtung” or 
breeding was a matter of debate at the turn of the century. The sexuate indeterminacy of 
the embryo until ten weeks spawned debates about originary femininity in all beings 
versus a “revolution” of the masculine in that transformative event we today call 
hormonal activation (thanks to Paul Möbius).11 We might think too of the uncertain status 
of the Malthusian-Spencerian “survival of the fittest,” as compared to the optimistic 
residues of Lamarckian “adaptation,” present even in the Darwin who wrote The 
Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals (1872)—one year after The Descent of Man 
(and thirteen years after the Origin of Species).12 Evolution, but without population 
genetics. I have not even touched on the anxiety of cultural degeneration and 
civilizational decadence—calling, half-consciously, for the salvation from without that 
Benjamin so sharply criticized. How then to calculate the effect of all this on 
philosophy—notably, those philosophies that worked at the middlebrow level, integrating 
popular science into questions of ethics and politics?  
Within this context, a number of traditional philosophical binaries that had 
retained their polemical force come into view, albeit with waning value: sameness and 
otherness, activity and passivity, presence versus absence, hearth and polis, static 
intermediacy versus dynamic intermediacy, causality versus spontaneity. The peculiar 
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interest of Weininger’s thought lies in its attempt to lead Nietzsche’s self-overcoming into 
Schelling’s unity with divinity13—via Kant’s Kingdom of ends. In this project, the 
idealism of the second part of his treatise hardened the binaries, giving them a permanent 
and formalist status in tension with his scientific discussion. This tension reflected his 
attempt to move past what he considered the nihilism of declining mores, but leapt to the 
fore with his resurrection of a battery of sclerotic philosophical dichotomies. But this 
constitutes his interest for us as well.  
 
The Belle Époque Canary 
 Weininger is a child of his time (1880-1903). He reflects its concerns and enacts 
an idealistic reversion not unknown to it.14 That is, Weininger passed from a typical fin 
de siècle Austrian interest in empiricism and philosophical monism, to a discovery of 
Freud’s emerging psychoanalysis, and finally to an attempt to reconcile Kant, Nietzsche, 
and Schelling.15 The brilliant and retiring Volksschuler who studied the classics had the 
gift for Latin and Greek that Nietzsche evinced. In 1898, he left philology for the natural 
sciences at the University of Vienna, turning by 1900 to biology, medicine, and 
philosophy, rather like Freud (Luft, 2003, 50). Like Freud as well, he knew Franz 
Brentano, and all three attended the Vienna Philosophical Society meetings. The 
university student Weininger studied zoology and physiology and proved a promising 
student in psychology (Luft, 2003, 50). The child of a famous goldsmith known 
throughout Europe, Weininger worked himself from the economic bourgeoisie into the 
cultured Bildungsbürgertum, mastering languages with the ease that Freud himself had 
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shown. Everything would suggest that, absent his disposition to depression, Weininger 
would have turned into a great psychologist or empiricist philosopher.  
Two events contributed to his aforementioned idealistic turn. Around 1901, 
Weininger’s encounter with German philosophy, notably the works of Kant, Schelling 
and Nietzsche, lead him to revise his voluminous, scientific thesis “Eros und Psyche,” 
producing instead a 600 page manuscript that he submitted to his crestfallen directors 
Jodl and Müllner for the doctorate. The final, published work, Geschlecht und Charakter 
was hardly shorter, coming in at 461 pages. As I indicated, the shorter version proved to 
be a two-part exercise: it evinced the uneasy coexistence of scientific research into 
sexuation (before “modern synthesis” genetics were framed in the late 1930s) and a 
hybrid of conceptions about the genius, Nietzschean self-overcoming, and the Kingdom 
of ends—which Weininger framed in terms of Kant’s second formulation of his 
categorical imperative: always treat humanity, whether in yourself or another person, as 
an end and not merely as a means.  
This philosophical aggregate was unstable. In Weininger’s case, it was vitalism 
and Kantianism that ultimately triumphed, and he came to regard his early scientific 
research as shallow. Correlatively, his increasingly unstable personality accounts for the 
Nietzsche-like eruptions in his book, which argues at length about the “feminine,” but 
also tries to undercut the anti-Semitism of his time. Two things must be kept in mind. 
First, Weininger was himself Jewish. His goal was to argue, circularly, that anti-Semitism 
was rooted in ressentiment and that anti-Semites often evinced characteristics more 
“Judaic” than many Jews in Vienna at the time; moreover, Jews were not to be blamed 
for “eliminating God,” the “Aryan” dislike of Jews was due to the greater effeminacy of 
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the former. To be sure, his view reflected stereotypes around Jews from reactions to the 
Ostjüde to assimilationist bromides such as we even find in the remarkable director of 
Die Fackel, Karl Kraus, who would later defend Weininger’s work. 
As indicated, my concern is with nihilism as epistemology, and we see a restricted 
methodological nihilism, akin to Benjamin’s critique, at work in Weininger’s initial 
deconstruction of sexual identity, which is the thematic that structures Sex and Character 
Part I. Weininger was among the first to develop a dialectics of sex versus gender, and to 
a lesser degree biology versus culture. He would argue that every living being was a 
mixture of masculine and feminine characteristics, and therefore one became a man or a 
woman through a process of cultural institution. Radicalizing Schopenhauer, he 
deconstructed sexuality into three dimensions of embodied sexuate intermediacies, social 
construction, and idealization.16 Like Nietzsche and his multiple forces or “intelligences” 
in bodies, Weininger argued that there is nothing that allows us to speak of a purely 
masculine genotype, much less a feminine one. Prior to any understanding of genes, 
hormones or their action, Weininger distilled from the zoological and embryological 
literature of his time what had to be the most plausible hypothesis: “the occurrence of 
intermediate sexual forms is determined by the different degrees of original sexual 
characteristics, in conjunction with the inner secretions (which probably vary in quality 
and quantity in each individual)” (Weininger, 2005, 25). Underlying the debates about 
sexuation were two questions: First, how and why does life diversify as it grows? Second, 
how are individuals to be thought in relation to species and sexuation? Rejecting two 
popular hypotheses about sexual difference, that it was a matter strictly of forms or that 
sex concerned only particular sites in an otherwise neutral human body, Weininger 
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adopted a cellular theory in which, “it is possible to imagine an infinite number of 
different sexual characteristics of every single cell” (Weininger, 2005, 17). We should 
keep in mind that Nietzsche glimpsed at least one of the terrible questions underlying this 
investigation: Why is it, or what is it, that causes a cell to start to divide?17 What forces 
transform the nucleus into two nuclei? What is active, what is passive? In a different 
sense, this too was a problem for Schelling’s cosmology as it was for Freud. 
It is important to note that Weininger’s attempt at philosophical systematicity 
patently fails. However, it fails in one significant sense: Weininger cannot reconcile the 
transcendental with the empirical; his nihilism as critical method slides directly into a 
nihilism as epistemology. His thought reflects the exacerbation of the critique of 
decadence arguing in favor of the self-overcoming of man, even at the cost of the gradual 
disappearance of the species. However, the path it takes to that end is not necessarily 
stranger than other philosophies that themselves evinced an “unendliche Mangel an Sein” 
[unending falling short of being], as Manfred Frank said of Schelling. Weininger writes: 
We may thus arrive at the following notion, which is hypothetical from the 
point of view of formal logic, but which is raised almost to the level of 
certainty by the…facts: every cell of the organism (as we will provisionally 
say) has a…certain sexual emphasis [bestimmte sexuelle Betonung]. 
According to our principle of the generality of intermediate sexual forms we 
add that this sexual character can be of different degrees.  
 The…assumption of different degrees in the development of the sexual 
characteristics would make it easy…to incorporate into our system pseudo-
hermaphroditism and even genuine hermaphroditism (the occurrence of 
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which among many animals has been established, albeit not with certainty 
among humans)…. If…as all empirical facts seem to dictate, the principle of 
innumerable transitional forms of sexuality between M and W is extended to 
all cells of the organism, [then] the difficulty that troubled Steenstrup is 
removed [how bisexuality would be distributed] and bisexuality [or 
bisexuation] no longer runs counter to nature. Based on this principle, it is 
possible to imagine an infinite number of different sexual characteristics of 
every single cell, from total masculinity through all intermediate forms down 
to its complete absence…total femininity. (Weininger, 2005, 17) 
 
 While that does not mean that gonads are equivalent to kidneys, much less to 
brains, Weininger hastens to add: 
The gonad is the organ in which the sexual characteristics of the individual 
appear most visible and in whose elementary morphological units they can 
most readily be demonstrated. (Weininger, 2005, 19)18  
 
 Following a current respected in biology but largely unknown to philosophy, 
which appears to be a refinement of Haeckle’s ontogenesis recapitulates philogenesis 
thesis, Weininger writes: 
…Naegeli, de Vries, Oskar Hertwig, et al. developed the…theory…that 
every cell of a multicellular organism carries in it all the qualities of the 
species and in the gonads these are only concentrated in a particularly 
marked form—as will perhaps appear to all researchers one day 
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[since]…every living being comes into existence through the…division of 
one single cell. (Weininger, 2005, 19-20)19 
 
The idea of life originating from a single cell with “forces” in it may have led 
Weininger to Schelling and his living “Basis” (Schelling, 1986, 30). Before the 
hypothesis of a kind of fundamental living matter, a base material which 19th century 
science called the “idioplasm,” the question of what fuels initial differentiation suggested 
the necessity of a binarity of forces so that there be something like activity and passivity, 
something like emergence and inertia—of which all the vitalists and Lebensphilosophe 
had spoken. Weininger proposes his solution. 
…we too can, and must, create the concepts of arrhenoplasm and thelyplasm 
as the two modifications in which any idioplasm can appear in sexually 
differentiated beings, bearing in mind that these concepts [arrhenoplasm and 
thelyplasm]…again stand for ideal cases, or boundaries, between which 
empirical reality resides. Thus the protoplasm which exists in reality 
increasingly departs from the ideal arrhenoplasm and, passing through a 
(real or imaginary) point of indifference (true hermaphroditism), turns into a 
protoplasm which is closer to thelyplasm [a feminized idioplasm] and from 
which it is…distinguished by a small differential. (Weininger, 2005, 20) 
 
 This was Weininger’s response to debates about the emergence of sexuate 
characteristics in embryology. In order for the multiple degrees of sexuation at the 
cellular level to be meaningful, two ideal boundaries had to be established, for the sake 
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of heuristics. These ideal boundaries would form the center of the investigation in the 
second half of the book, An Investigation of Fundamental Principles—the moment at 
which Weininger’s critical nihilism slides into epistemological nihilism. 
 
 Working with a polarity of ideal masculine and ideal feminine, which 
phenomenalize as “emphases” [“Betonungen”] in bodies, Weininger inserted his schema 
into a German-Darwinian (Wilhelm Roux and Ernst Haeckel) framework: the 
Betonungen had to serve an evolutionary purpose. For him, this purpose was the 
facilitation of sexual attraction and reproduction. Influenced by his classical education, 
Weininger started from the Aristophanic thesis of the divided, one-time complete being 
in search of its complement. He thus proposed that the quantity of masculine influence in 
a given being was proportionate first to the quantity of feminine influence, and could be 
expressed as a ratio, like 61 to 39 in a given individual. Further, this person, most likely a 
male, would be attractive to another person, no matter what their socialized gender was, 
provided they had something close to the inverse proportion of emphasis, say 61% 
femininity to 39% masculinity. For this, he developed the algorithm of maximal sexual 
affinity, factoring in two other elements: the “analytical function of the time individuals 
are able to act upon each other” (Weininger, 2005, 35), and a constant, supposed to 
represent what we know, scientifically, about sexuality now, versus what we should 
know in the decades to come.  
I want to emphasize that Weininger is here separating sexual expression from 
sexual attraction, but also sexual attraction from sexuation per se, i.e., sex from gender. 
In terms largely untouched by philosophers up until then, we might say that Weininger 
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was attempting to approach the question of identity in an a priori sense that 
simultaneously took account of sexuation even as it dissolved the social criteria with 
which his society had defined sexuality. He pursued this down to the movement of 
animals and sex cells.  
Wilhelm Pfeffer called these movements [of sex cells like spermatozoids] 
chemotactic and coined the term chemotropism for all these phenomena…. 
There seem to be many indications that among animals the attraction 
exercised by the female when perceived by the male…through the sense 
organs…is…analogous to chemotactical attraction. (Weininger, 2005, 37) 
 
 Weininger cited other research of his time and recalled Goethe’s chemical novel, 
Elective Affinities, as a prescient literary speculation on forces at work in sexual 
attraction. From there, he dealt with education and socialization, feminine men and 
masculine women (Weininger, 2005, 50 ff.). Above all, he was looking to combine what 
he called a “differential psychology” with biological concepts; notably the principle of 
correlation phenomena and the concept of function (Weininger, 2005, 54-56). The 
correlation principle argued that organs in a body were mutually adapted to each other, 
facilitating nutrition, safety, and competitiveness. Weininger extended it to a range of 
physical preferences between individuals. He did so using an evolutionary notion of 
function in light of species.  
 So much for the scientific beginnings of Sex and Character. Its ambition was to 
emancipate men and women from the straightjacket of essentialist sexuate types; it was 
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also hoped that anti-Semites might realize the groundlessness of their ressentiment 
against somewhat effeminate beings.  
 
From the Empirical to the Ideal Types: Mann und Frau to Mann und Weib 
We are perhaps more sophisticated today than the morphologists, social theorists, 
and physiognomists of the Belle Époque. Nevertheless, the question of the relationship 
between acculturation and biology, or discursive practices, cultural objects, and bodily 
drives, remains. Indeed, it turns on the nihilistic social imaginary underlying and 
conditioning the turn of the century embryology—not to mention the logics of life that 
philosophers like Schelling had contributed to German language physics and biology.20 
Above all, Weininger’s sexuate “Betonungen” depended on the limit conditions which he 
calls “heuristic,” the ideal types that make up Part II. The ideal types required a 
philosophical elaboration in order to be grounded principially. The second half of the 
book effectuated the passage from the scientific literature, a popularized empiricism, to a 
synchretic idealism whose concepts would promptly show their uncanny superannuation. 
Underlying this was Weininger’s Kantian-Schellingian vision: a world in which no one 
treated another in the worst instrumental sense possible, i.e., sexually. And this alone 
permitted man to rise in purity toward unity with the godhead (Schelling’s vision). 
What is worse than the science Weininger attempted to popularize was his 
conviction of the necessity of a meta-biology, grounded transcendentally. There, his  
fear of effeminacy and nihilism cashed itself out in static a priori categories. As 
indicated, the ideal symbolization for masculinity was presence, action, energeia, 
plenitude, or simply the number 1. As ideal type, the feminine was passivity, inaction, 
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dunamis, absence, or the cipher 0. Bon gré mal gré, Weininger’s own anti-Semitism was 
an attempt to protect Jews from worse forms of Jewish hatred than his own: what made 
“the Jew” dislikable was the surprising quantity of femininity he possessed. In classic 
colonialist language, Jews, like women, like Africans, were imitative unoriginal 
creatures, incapable of creation or innovation. Caught in service to the species, all these 
groups consisted of herd animals rather than true individuals. I would like to make you 
laugh with citations from Weininger to this effect, but as indicated, he is a canary in the 
coalmine called nihilism: he stated what philosophers discussed in euphemisms and code, 
but did not generally publish. The conundrum was how to think socio-political upheavals 
with the inherited categories.  
Interesting here is that the great stigma in all these cases is the lack, or abyssal 
inertia that characterizes “Weiblichkeit” (femininity) as a component in women or men. 
That lack means that femininity and even “Jewishness” become analogous to Schelling’s 
“principle of darkness” or ground that is the inertial prime matter in all things, including 
God. In 1809, Schelling argued: 
All birth is birth out of darkness into light… We recognize…that the concept 
of becoming is the only one adequate to the nature of things. But the process 
of their becoming cannot be in God, viewed absolutely, since they are distinct 
from him toto genere….To be separate from God, [things] would have to 
carry on this becoming on a basis different from him. But since there is 
nothing outside God, this contradiction can only be solved by things having 
their basis in that within God which is not God himself, i.e. in that which is the 




Lacking all definition, the feminine—like the dark Basis in God and nature—is 
boundariless, yet paradoxically serves as quanta of exchange. “Matchmaking [Kuppelei] 
is a blurring of boundaries,” argued Weininger, “and the Jew is the blurrer of boundaries 
kat’exokhen. He is the opposite pole of [the] aristocratism [of individuation]. The 
principle of any aristocratism is the strictest observation of all boundaries between 
human beings, but the Jew [just like the female] is the born communist and always wants 
community” (Weininger, 2005, 281).  
While we might find this qualification complimentary, an enduring philosophical 
difficulty is evinced. Slavoj Zizek finds in Weininger the precursor to Lacan’s “the 
woman does not exist,” and by extension the anticipation of our own recognition of the 
profound void at the heart of what we call subjectivity.21 It remains that we have here a 
nihil that is active. It is active as Eros—just as Schelling’s Basis was active as longing or 
“Sehnsucht.” All of these terms express the search for ways to conceptualize movement 
and affect between beings. That is why “matchmaking” is a genteel translation of the 
derogatory “Kuppelei.”22 But that Kuppelei could be dissociated from the unifying force 
of Eros, that cipher, is doubtful. It is unclear how a cipher—how the transcendental 
feminine—can matchmake but not cause movement or consolidation. All of this, of 
course, revolves around the epistemology of nihilism and Weininger’s futile search for 
ways beyond it.  
Weininger’s solution to the difficulty at the ideal level could only be ratified by 
the empirical fact that all beings are composed of masculine and feminine forces at the 
cellular level. But the empirical solution of intersexuation ran aground the self-
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destruction of its definitional limits and, notably, the active nothingness that was ideal 
femininity. This underscores the reciprocal dependence in Weininger of the empirical and 
transcendental levels, as well as their impossible coexistence.  
The Nietzschean dimension of the work concerns self-overcoming: every man 
must overcome the nothingness in him, but the only ones who can truly do this are those 
qualified as “geniuses.” A Romantic theme, the genius recalls the saint in Nietzsche’s 
writings like Human, All too Human (1878). The genius in Weininger was the bridge—
between the empirical mischling and the overman. The genius was also the true moralist 
and authentic monad.23 The genius’s connection with the universe is his Kantian-
Nietzschean capacity to find and bestow meaning, to approach the sublime in one’s own 
figure. “Consequently he evaluates everything,” said Weininger, “both within and outside 
him according to this idea [of intrinsic unity]; and for that reason…everything in his 
view, rather than being a function of time, represents one great and eternal idea” 
(Weininger, 2005, 148).  
From the genius too flows the moral law; it is not the affair of formal, practical 
reason alone.  
[Ordinary human beings] may relate to the sun or the moon, but they 
certainly lack the “starry heavens” and the “moral law.” The moral law 
comes from the human soul, which holds all totality, and which can 
contemplate everything because it is everything. The starry heavens and the 
moral law, they too are basically one and the same thing. The universalism 
of the categorical imperative is the universalism of the universe, the infinity 
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of the universe is only a symbol of the infinity of the moral will. (Weininger, 
2005, 150) 
 
Here, Weininger attempts to open a path to the Übermensch precisely by a return 
to the pre-critical Kant’s sublime, embodied by great men, or the genius.  
Only the man of genius is a complete human being. What is contained in 
every individual as a possibility of being human…in the Kantian sense, as 
dunamei, is alive and fully developed as energeia in the genius… He is 
himself the quiescence of all laws and therefore free…. (Weininger, 2005, 
151) 
 
  Consistent with the practical task of the book, which changed as Weininger 
studied Nietzsche and Idealism, the highest human destiny had to permit the authentic 
embodiment of its ideal. If recourse to the genius is Romantic, it remains that the bridge 
beyond “man” could only be unity with the divine. For such a self-overcoming, man had 
to overcome two things: first, his action had to be based not on an ethics of compassion, 
but on one of respect. “As was first articulated by Kant, the only being in the world that 
we respect is the human” (Weininger, 2005, 154-55). But how to respect the non-genius; 
how to respect other human beings, say women, or Jews? “The first [way is] by ignoring 
them…the second, by taking notice of them…and the third, trying to recognize them. 
Only by being interested in them, thinking of them…trying to understand them as 
themselves…can one honor one’s fellow-humans” (Weininger, 2005, 155). This first 
overcoming required a Nietzschean forgetfulness as well. More specifically, man had to 
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overcome his bisexuate nature. This meant that he had to overcome eros or Kuppelei in 
himself. Such overcoming was crucial from the moral perspective too, because it was 
ultimately man’s desire that constituted woman as a gender (not as a sex). “Man” makes 
“women” by desiring them, in the way that Schelling’s “self-will” is aroused in order that 
love find a material basis or resistance through which to realize itself (Weininger, 2005, 
219ff).24 This material is his own flesh—or the feminine—just as, in Schelling’s 
beginning, it was the Basis, the almost-nothing out of which God arose as the “One.” But 
Weininger continued to argue, in Kantian terms, that the instrumentalization of a being 
with more “femininity” than “masculinity” in it, was morally reprehensible to human 
destiny (Weininger, 2005, 224-25). Nothing impeded our reunification with the deity 
more effectively than the instrumentalization of another human, notably but not 
exclusively, erotic instrumentalization.  
Thus sexual intercourse in any case contradicts the idea of humanity; not 
because asceticism is a duty, but…because in sexual intercourse Woman 
wants to become an object, a thing, and Man really does her the favor of 
regarding her as a thing and not as a living human being with internal 
psychic processes. That is why Man despises Woman as soon as he has 
possessed her, and Woman feels that she is now despised, even though two 
minutes earlier she was idealized. The only thing that a human being can 
respect in a human being is the idea, the idea of humanity. The contempt for 
Woman (and for Man himself)…is the surest indication that the idea has 
been violated. And anybody who cannot understand what is meant by this 
Kantian idea of humanity might at least consider that the women concerned 
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are his sisters, his mother, his female relatives: it is for our own sake that 
Woman should be…respected as a human being and not degraded, as she 
always is through sexuality. (Weininger, 2005, 312) 
 
 I hope that this quote (and the underlying science, at this time more footling than 
sheer “pseudoscience”) shows why this book was so confusing yet so seductive to a host 
of German and English intellectuals from Wittgenstein to Karl Kraus, to Schoenberg, to 
Hermann Broch,25 Elias Cannetti, Thomas Bernhard, James Joyce, and Heinrich Böll.26 
Between 1903, the year Weininger committed suicide following his conversion to 
Protestantism, and 1947, Sex and Character went through 28 editions and was translated 
into many languages. Wittgenstein called it a great error. Molly Bloom was said to be, in 
Joyce’s Ulysses, modeled after Weininger’s Woman. But then the Belle Époque knew so 
much worse.27  
 
My argument concerns the attempt of middlebrow philosophy, in the era of the 
demise of Idealism, to come to terms with biology and the socio-political mutations of 
the time. With the separation of psychology, psychiatry, and philosophy, thinking faced 
what could be called a problem of concepts or categories. A philosophy like Weininger’s, 
which began as critique and a subtle understanding of finitude, veered into what I have 
called a nihilistic epistemology. Middlebrow philosophy proved inadequate to 





Many who were still impressed with the older philosophy could not separate 
Idealism, Romanticism and the Lebensphilosophie inaugurated in part by Schelling. And 
it is not without interest to note that the ultimate, contradictory conclusion of Sex and 
Character follows closely the structure of Schelling’s Philosophical Inquiries into the 
Nature of Human Freedom.  
In Schelling, the Absolute must be considered alive, less it drift into the formalism 
he suspected of Hegel. Like all life, the Absolute or universe gives birth to itself, thanks 
to the coexistence of two principles that were interdependent but did not interact directly 
with each other. In the place of Hegel’s dialectic, Schelling brought Lebensphilosophie 
into the Absolute itself. Weininger would resort to this exceptional logic to situate his 
Nietzschean-Kantian self-overcoming within a cosmological framework. The ultimate 
outcome of this process for Schelling had to be the triumph of the light or the form-giving 
dimension of the Absolute—for Weininger, it was the Masculine. With that end, the 
inertial Basis, which was present at the beginning as “almost nothing,” would gradually 
be eliminated—like “das Weib” in Weininger. The divergent principles would never be 
fully reconciled, but the unmoving, amorphous Basis had to be left far behind or simply 
disappear into pure light. In so doing, the attraction the Basis exerted on the One or the 
light, like an originary gravity, would be annulled.28 Schelling urges, 
For, as in the beginning of creation, which was nothing other than the birth 
of light, the dark principle had to be there as its Basis, so that light could be 
raised out of it (as the actual out of the merely potential); so there must be 
another basis for the birth of spirit [in humans], and hence a second 
principle of darkness [the unconscious source of human evil], which must be 
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as much higher than [the status of the basis] as the spirit [or divine love in 
humans] is higher than light [in nature]. This principle is precisely the spirit 
of evil which has been awakened in creation through the arousing of the 
dark natural Basis—that is the disunion of light and darkness—to which the 
spirit of love is now opposed as a higher ideal, [just] as before[,] light was 
opposed to the unruly movement of nature in its beginnings…. (Schelling, 
1986, 52-53; 85) 
 
Conclusion 
The reader who began Weininger’s book likely thought that Weininger was 
working out a law bringing bodies and personalities together, even as he argued that there 
was no simple norm for “empirical” males or females. Yet, not even half way through the 
work, one notes the change in tone and ends. In their ideal forms, Man and Woman, 
Mann und Weib, are aligned with Schelling’s two principles in the Absolute, the Basis 
and the One. Consistent with Schelling’s logic, the unfolding and destiny of these two 
forms are related but different. Like Schelling’s Basis, Weininger’s ideal Nothing exerts 
an arousing force on the One, which in turn creates empirical femininity through its 
emergent, “masculine” desire. In Weininger, the One and the Zero of ideal masculinity 
and femininity are directed to follow the course of Schelling’s two principles, proceeding 
toward the entelechy of union-in-divinity. Weininger’s peculiar reading of Kant’s 
“Kingdom of Ends” provides the practical itinerary toward union with the godhead. 
Reinterpreting Kant, such that One and Zero might no longer instrumentalize each other 
by coupling, Weininger aligns Kant with the return Schelling described of the two 
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principles to their ultimate situation, where the force of love has sublimated the Basis in 
pure spirit, thereby making the Basis obsolete as a pseudo-force and pseudo-presence. 
For Weininger, that would be the ideal destiny of the type “Woman,” of das Weib.  
If the repetition of historic tragedy looks like farce, then Weininger was farce and 
suffering, but he was not alone as playwright of nihilism. The consequences of his 
philosophical nostalgia and the patent superannuation of idealistic concepts had 
consequences for the decades that followed.29  
The Weininger effect was a powerful, intellectual fashion, which endured for 
more than a generation. It should be emphasized that, in the Belle Époque, opposition to 
capitalist expansion and concentration took the form of sometimes shocking critiques of 
Liberalism, but also of ethnic and economic chaos.30 Karl Kraus, the influential editor of 
the review Die Fackel (1899-1934), had some sympathy for social democracy. But he 
was deeply influenced by a comparably powerful aristocratic elitism. Kraus defended 
Weininger after his suicide and his influential journal appeared up to the famous issue of 
1934 entitled “Warum die Fackel nicht erscheint”—“Why the Fackel is No Longer 
Published.”  
It bears repeating that the constitution of social and political identity proceeds 
thanks to aesthetics; I mean the proliferating imageries that help constitute Cornelius 
Castoriadis’s “social imaginaries,” which he describes as “miasmas.”31 But these images 
could not take hold, obtain legitimacy, much less engage debate—including, among 
intellectuals—if it were not for the ability of certain concepts to survive their depletion of 
content and recombine with other concepts, a process intrinsic to the expansion of 
nihilism. The unfolding of these combinations is not tidy, but in 19th century society, it 
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followed certain patterns: the ability for alterity to be aligned with potentiality, 
effeminacy, or degeneracy;32 the ability for alterity to assimilate to hypertrophism, 
whether that of masculinity in the case of colonized peoples, or of intellect, in the case of 
Jews. Once displaced, both masculinity and femininity permitted combinations with 
infantilism, whether corporeal (written indelibly into African bodies), or political 
(inscribed on the Jewish body). When correlated with idealist logics, these categories 
took on a semi-conscious affective charge, influencing the use and value of concepts like 
identity, unity, plurality, difference. Here is where the epistemology of nihilism shows 
itself most clearly. In the case of Weininger, but also in that of Schopenhauer and other 
post- or para-Kantians, categories were often animated by the drive to reconcile a root of 
pure reason with freedom and the practical good. This is why Benjamin insisted that 
nihilism, understood as a method, must never let go of finitude and can only proceed as 
unremitting critique. There is not enough space here to pursue the two levels I am 
describing: ongoing popular and middle-brow categorical combinations, which 
supplement or promote ideology, and some higher level encounters between these 
categories and philosophy (at least those in the Belle Époque). 
Karl Kraus had no idea that National Socialists would co-opt the discourse of his 
satirical review, Die Fackel. When this happened he protested in disgust, insisting that his 
was always a “defense of nature and spirit against the destructive powers of a deviated 
intelligence and a badly mastered technology” (Jacques Le Rider, 1990, 132, 148).33 And 
yet, even in binaries such as “nature” and “spirit,” we hear, still echoing, strains of 
idealist and vitalist thought, in service to a nihilism Kraus could not have failed to 
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recognize. The conundrum, for us, concerns perceiving the mutations of the serious into 
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1 A version of this paper was published in Daniel M. Price and Ryan J. Johnson (eds), 
The Movement of Nothingness: Trust in the Emptiness of Time, Aurora, CO: Davies 
Group, 2013, pp. 51-72.  
2 “…It is immoral to turn a human being into the effect of a cause, to produce a 
conditioned human being, as does parenthood, and the ultimate source of the bondage 
and determinacy which accompany the freedom and spontaneity of a human being is the 
fact that he has been created in such an immoral fashion. Reason has no interest 
whatsoever in the eternal continuation of humankind. Whoever wants to perpetuate 
humankind wants to perpetuate a problem and a guilt, indeed the only problem and the 
only guilt that there are, for the aim is the deity and the ending of humankind in the deity, 
a pure separation between good and evil, between something and nothing.” Otto 
Weininger, 1921, p. 458. Hereafter GC. See also the recent English translation, Sex and 
Character: An Investigation of Fundamental Principles, trans. by Ladislaus Löb; D. 
Steuer and L. Marcus (eds), Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005, pp. 311-12. 
Hereafter SC. 
3 Adi Ophir, “ ….”  in this collection. 
4 Gorgias’ syllogism was: there is nothing; if there were something, we could not know it; 
if we could know it, we could not communicate it to others. 
5 Benjamin phrased this as the imperative “to strive for such a passing away” as can be 
found in the movement of life and death typical to nature. For him, this would be the task 




practices created by human beings. Anti-messianic, anti-eschatological, Benjamin’s 
“Fragment” mobilizes nihilism to hold open both conceptions of a good life and a 
desirable society, without assuring them or merging the theological and the political that 
are found together in epistemological nihilism. 
6 Um hinter diesen Sinn zu kommen, muß von einem Phänomen ausgegangen werden, 
das, so alt und so bekannt es ist, noch nirgends und niemals einer ernsteren Beachtung 
oder gar Würdigung wert befunden wurde. Es ist kein anderes als das Phänomen der 
Kuppelei, welches zum tiefsten, zum eigentlichen Einblick in die Natur des Weibes zu 
führen vermag (Weininger, 1921, 337). 
7 As Canguilhem put it in his landmark, Le normal et le pathologique: “The concept of 
norm is an original concept that cannot be reduced, in physiology or elsewhere, to a 
concept objectively determinable by scientific methods. Thus strictly speaking there is no 
biological science of the normal. There is a science of biological situations and 
conditions called normal. This science is physiology.” See Le normal et le pathologique, 
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966, 204, my trans.     
8 Zuvor jedoch will ich genau angeben, in welchem Sinne ich vom Judentum rede. Es 
handelt sich mir nicht um eine Rasse und nicht um ein Volk, noch weniger freilich um ein 
gesetzlich anerkanntes Bekenntnis. Man darf das Judentum nur für eine Geistesrichtung, 
für eine psychische Konstitution halten, welche für alle Menschen eine Möglichkeit 
bildet, und im historischen Judentum bloß die grandioseste Verwirklichung gefunden hat 
(Weininger, 1921, 402). Henceforth, only the English will be used.  
9 Albert S. Lindemann, Anti-Semitism before the Holocaust, Essex, UK: Pearson 




eighteenth century until the eve of the Holocaust, the Jewish population of Europe 
increased faster than that of the non-Jewish population. There was also a more rapid 
move of Jews than non-Jews into urban areas, especially capital cities, another kind of 
significant rise in status. Per capita income rose more rapidly among Jews…The 
percentage of Jews who were among the very wealthiest citizens of Europe’s nation 
states shot up by the end of the century, as did the number of Jews who won Nobel prizes 
after 1905.” See Lindemann, 2000, p. 53ff. 
10 We need only think only of telegony and neoteny: the disconcerting “stain of the 
quagga” or zebra on the mare, who was then crossed with an Arabian stallion only to 
produce a striped hybrid in her second issue. For neoteny, consider literature on the 
African child, observed as an infant possessed of greater motor and cognitive abilities 
than the European child, only to be declared apt to develop up to adolescence and then to 
stop. 
11 See Francis Schiller, A Möbius Strip: Fin de Siècle Neuropsychiatry and Paul Möbius, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982, pp. 49-65. 
12 Charles Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, New York, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. 
13 F. W. J. Schelling, Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom, trans. 
by James Gutman, La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1936, 1986.  
14 Such idealism even shows up in the positivism of an Ernst Mach, with the 
“ensoulment” of matter. 
15 David S. Luft, Eros and Inwardness in Vienna: Weininger, Musil, Doderer, Chicago: 




16 Luft writes, in “Otto Weininger’s Vision of Gender and Modern Culture” in EIV: 
“Weininger’s achievement was to separate discourse about gender from literal 
assumptions about individual men and women…What makes his argument interesting is 
his attempt to deconstruct his culture’s understanding of gender and to develop a 
methodology that distinguishes male and female types from individual men and women.” 
He is careful to observe that Weininger nevertheless “seems to assume [at times] that a 
man can become 100 percent male, although a woman cannot [lest she be basically 
nothing],” pp. 54, 57. In addition, while a man can be close to ‘female’, Weininger will 
write, “the woman can never become a male” (SC, 241; cited by Luft, EIV, 63).  This is 
largely because, like a host of others, Weininger begins from the assumption that the 
male is largely the human norm (cf. EIV, 61).   
17 Friedrich Nietzsche, Kritische Studienausgabe XII, 1885-1886, Giorgio Colli and 
Mazzino Montinari (eds), Berlin: de Gruyter, 1988, 2 [92], pp. 106-07.  
18 The citation continues: “However, we must also assume that the genus-specific, 
species-specific, and family-specific qualities of an organism are represented most 
completely in the gonads.” See Weininger, 2005, p. 19. 
19 Note however that this was not August Weismann’s theory, which argued that sex cells 
are specific and localized, not found throughout the body. Weismann’s germ plasma 
theory was developed before 1900.  
20 Schelling was the editor of the Zeitschrift für spekulative Physik at the time he 
published the Philosophical Inquiries, 1809.  
21 Slavoj Zizek, “Otto Weininger, or, ‘Woman doesn’t exist’” in Zizek, The Metastases of 




nothingness, Weininger’s “Weib” or ideal type of the female is something generated by 
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